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Abstract: Governments have failed to adequately tackle the rise in childhood obesity rates 
worldwide. Instead, food and beverage companies are increasingly relied upon to support 
public health efforts to prevent childhood obesity. Yet, the suitability of companies as 
public health partners must be questioned. This article asks whether international human 
rights law places responsibilities on food and beverage companies that could mitigate 
inherent conflicts. Companies’ responsibilities in relation to children’s rights to health and 
adequate food in the context of childhood obesity are analysed with reference to, inter alia, 
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Children’s 
Rights and Business Principles and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The human 
rights reports of a selection of major food and beverage companies are then evaluated in 
light of these sources. This article determines that, so far, the food and beverage companies 
reviewed have failed to acknowledge their impact on nutrition focused rights. Existing 
guidance leaves companies with too much flexibility to mitigate conflicts effectively. It is 
argued that stronger indicators on companies’ responsibilities to respect children’s right to 
freedom from obesity are necessary. 
Keywords: Business and Human Rights; Children’s Rights; Right to Adequate Food; 
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1 Introduction 
Global childhood obesity has reached epidemic proportions, harming children’s health and 
spiking healthcare costs. To counter these trends, powerful global actors must address the drivers 
of childhood obesity, not least access to nutritious food. States have important regulatory powers, 
yet most have failed to adopt effective legal and policy measures. In response to this inertia, 
commentators argue that international human rights law (IHRL) places obligations on states to 
prevent and treat obesity.1 In light of the global impact of obesity, human rights could form an 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Amandine Garde, 'Advertising Regulation and the Protection of Children-Consumers in the 
European Union: In the Best Interests of ... Commercial Operators?' (2011) 19 Int'l J Children's Rts 523; 
Elizabeth Handsley and others, ‘A Children’s Rights Perspective on Food Advertising to Children’ (2014) 22 
Int’l J Children’s Rts 93; Katharina Ó Cathaoir, 'Childhood Obesity and the Right to Health' (2016) 18 Health 
and Hum Rights 249. 
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important source of obligations; IHRL enshrines universal rights and corresponding 
responsibilities that apply in every state that ratifies the treaty.  
Drawing on this growing discourse, this article analyses the human rights responsibilities 
of food and beverage companies contributing to the obesity epidemic, instead of focusing on 
states, the primary duty bearers under human rights. Obligations — what companies must do —
are legally binding, whereas our focus is on responsibilities — what companies should do. The 
article asks, to what extent do international human rights norms and practices provide a 
framework for holding the producers and promoters of unhealthy food products responsible for 
their adverse impact on children’s rights?2 Specifically, what responsibilities do food and 
beverage companies have in relation to children’s rights to health and adequate food in the 
context of obesity, and what actions do companies take to meet their responsibilities? Special 
focus is placed on the marketing of unhealthy food to children.  
The article introduces childhood obesity as a global concern and the role of transnational 
food and beverage companies in contributing to its spread. Despite food companies’ tactics, 
governments and international organisations frequently collaborate with them to prevent obesity. 
Although the World Health Organization (WHO) could play a powerful role in shaping norms at 
the global level, it has so far not been instrumental in clarifying food and beverage companies’ 
responsibilities.  
In light of this gap, I explore companies’ responsibilities under IHRL with a focus on 
children’s rights to adequate food and health under the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)3, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),4 and 
non-binding standards, including the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (hereafter, UNGP), and the UNICEF Children’s Rights and Business Principles 
(hereafter, Children’s Principles).5 Guidance from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health (hereafter, Special Rapporteur on the right to health), and the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food, is also analysed.  
The article then evaluates the extent to which a selection of major food and beverage 
companies internalise the guidance coming from the above bodies and analyse their adverse 
impacts on nutrition rights in the context of obesity. The 2016 human rights policies emanating 
from Coca-Cola, Mars, PepsiCo, Nestlé, McDonald’s, General Mills and Mondelez are assessed 
as these entities represent a mixture of food and beverage companies, and restaurants. Given 
their market position, these multinationals are likely to have both a significant impact on the 
above-mentioned rights, and the resources to assess and remedy this impact. Finally, 
                                                 
2 While there is no universal definition of ‘unhealthy’, this piece relies on the nutrient profile developed by the 
WHO’s European regional office for the regulation of unhealthy food marketing. WHO Regional Office for 
Europe, WHO Regional Office for Europe Nutrient Profile Model (WHO 2015). 
3 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
1577 UNTS 3. 
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
5 John Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework’ (21 March 2011) 
A/HRC/17/31; UNICEF, Save the Children and UN Global Compact, ‘Children’s Rights and Business 
Principles’ (2012). 
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recommendations are made on how to better entrench food and beverage companies’ 
responsibilities for consumer health, with the potential of The Binding Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights considered. 
2 The Global Challenge of Childhood Obesity 
Childhood obesity is a global concern due to its increased prevalence worldwide, its impact on 
children’s health, and the associated health care costs.6 WHO estimates that there are 
approximately 42 million children with obesity.7 While rates in the developed world are 
stabilising, there has not been significant reductions in prevalence. Instead, obesity is rising 
fastest in middle-income countries.8 Childhood obesity is a contributor to and risk factor of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) in childhood and adolescence, including diabetes, 
cardiovascular problems and certain cancers.9 Further, children with obesity experience 
stigmatisation, bullying and social isolation.10 Additionally, having obesity in childhood 
substantially increases the likelihood of having obesity as an adult.11 
Obesity also leads to direct and indirect costs, highlighting the business case for 
childhood obesity prevention. In the US, a recent study estimated the average lifetime medical 
cost of a child with obesity was 19,000 USD.12 In 2007, WHO Europe assessed that obesity was 
responsible for up to 6% of healthcare costs in the region (due to increased prevalence, this 
percent has likely increased).13 The World Food Programme estimates that, in 2014, over 
nutrition cost Chile, Ecuador and Mexico 493 million USD, 13.1 billion USD and 7.3 billion 
USD respectively in healthcare and absenteeism.14 As obesity rates increase, the related costs 
will rise. 
                                                 
6 For example, European Commission, ‘European Union action plan on childhood obesity 2014 – 2020’ (24 
February 2014); WHO, 'Why does Childhood Obesity and Overweight Matter? '  
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/childhood_consequences/en/> accessed 14 May 2017.  
7 Marie Ng and others, 'Global, regional, and national prevalence of overweight and obesity in children and adults 
during 1980-2013;2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013' (2014) 384 Lancet 
766. 
8 Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blössner and Elaine Borghi, 'Global prevalence and trends of overweight and obesity 
among preschool children' (2010) 92 The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 1257. 
9 A. Llewellyn and others, 'Childhood obesity as a predictor of morbidity in adulthood: a systematic review and 
meta-analysis' (2016) 17 Obesity Reviews 56. 
10 Rebecca W Rees and others, '‘It’s on your conscience all the time’: a systematic review of qualitative studies 
examining views on obesity among young people aged 12–18 years in the UK' (2014) 4 BMJ Open 1. 
11 WHO, Report of the commission on ending childhood obesity (2016); M. Simmonds and others, 'Predicting adult 
obesity from childhood obesity: a systematic review and meta-analysis' (2016) 17 Obes Rev 95. 
12 Eric Andrew Finkelstein, Wan Chen Kang Graham and Rahul Malhotra, 'Lifetime Direct Medical Costs of 
Childhood Obesity' (2014) 133 Pediatrics 1. 
13 Francesco Branca, Haik Nikogasian and Tim Lobstein (eds), The Challenge of Obesity in the WHO European 
Region and the strategies for response: summary (WHO Europe 2007) 
<http://www.euro.who.int/en/publications/abstracts/challenge-of-obesity-in-the-who-european-region-and-the-
strategies-for-response-the.-summary> accessed 14 May 2017. 
14 Andrés  Fernandez and Rodrigo  Martínez, The double burden: The combined economic impact of undernutrition 
and obesity in Latin America and the Caribbean (World Food Programme 2017) 52. 
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2.1 The role of the food and beverage industry 
Over the last decades, there has been a dramatic shift in what individuals eat, a shift that 
is spreading. While there is no universal definition of unhealthy food, there is general agreement 
on its characteristics: nutrient poor and high in fat, salt and sugar. High intake of refined 
carbohydrates, added sugars, fats, and animal-source foods now define the Western diet.15 Sugar, 
once a luxury commodity, is consumed in higher quantities than ever before, especially through 
sugar sweetened beverages 16  Sales of ultra-processed foods have soared in high-income 
countries with middle-income economies mirroring these patterns.17 In Canada, the increase of 
total calories from ultra-processed food rose from 24.4% in 1938 to 54.9% in 2001; In Brazil, 
from 18.7% in 1987 to 26.1% in 2003.18  
With unhealthy diet being a major contributor to obesity, the role of the companies that 
promote and produce this food should be analysed.19  As a small group of multinationals 
dominate the global food economy, changes in their practices could positively contribute to 
healthy diets. Worldwide, the top ten packaged food companies make up 15.2% of sales. The top 
ten soft drink companies account for 52.3% of sales worldwide, with Coca-Cola and PepsiCo 
comprising 25.9% and 11.5% of sales, respectively.20 These companies profit from selling ultra-
processed food (nutrient dense, high in salt and sugar, with little to no vitamins), which is long-
lasting, and therefore offers larger profit margins than fresh foods.21 Given the size of their 
market share and the epidemic of obesity, we should consider whether food companies have 
responsibilities beyond profits. 
The need to examine food and beverage companies is heightened as they increasingly 
target middle and low-income countries that offer underexplored markets with huge, fast 
growing populations. Simultaneously, childhood obesity rates are rising fastest in middle-income 
states.22 Obesity is also increasing in low-income countries, leading to a ‘double burden’ of both 
under and over nutrition.23 Globalisation, trade liberalisation,24 urbanisation, and 
                                                 
15 Rob Moodie and others, 'Profits and pandemics: prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-
processed food and drink industries' (2013) 381 Lancet 670. 
16 Barry M. Popkin, Linda S. Adair and Shu Wen Ng, 'NOW AND THEN: The Global Nutrition Transition: The 
Pandemic of Obesity in Developing Countries' (2012) 70 Nutr Rev 3. 
17 P. Baker and S. Friel, 'Food systems transformations, ultra-processed food markets and the nutrition transition in 
Asia' (2016) 12 Global Health 80. 
18 CA Monteiro and others, 'Ultra-processed products are becoming dominant in the global food system' (2013) 14 
Obes Rev 21. 
19 Although the causes of obesity are multifaceted, including behavioural and genetic factors, obesity is primarily 
associated with unhealthy diet and lack of physical exercise. See, for instance: WHO, Global Status Report on 
NCDs 2014 (WHO 2014). For a critical account of this explanation: SW.Keith and others, 'Putative contributors 
to the secular increase in obesity: exploring the roads less traveled' (2006) 30 Int J Obes 1585.  
20 Eleanore Alexander, Derek Yach and George A. Mensah, 'Major multinational food and beverage companies and 
informal sector contributions to global food consumption: implications for nutrition policy' (2011) 7 Global 
Health 26. 
21 Moodie and others (n 15). 
22 Popkin and others (n 16). 
23 Trishnee Bhurosy and Rajesh Jeewon, ‘Overweight and Obesity Epidemic in Developing Countries: A Problem 
with Diet, Physical Activity, or Socioeconomic Status?’ (2014) Sci World J 1; Asnawi Abdullah, ‘The Double 
Burden of Undernutrition and Overnutrition in Developing Countries: an Update’ (2015) 4(3) Curr Obes Rep 
337. 
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Westernisation25 enable this ‘nutrition transition’ – a dietary shift from traditional diets high in 
grains or other carbohydrates to a Western one high in sugar, fat and animal protein. Indeed, 
purchases of snack foods are increasing fastest in low income countries.26 Over the last decades, 
the cost of processed food has also decreased, while fruit and vegetable prices has continued to 
soar.27  
Marketing of unhealthy food is one dimension of this ‘obesogenic’ environment.28 A 
series of systematic literature reviews concludes that food marketing targeting children is 
widespread, with unhealthy foods, such as breakfast cereals, soft drinks, and fast foods, most 
heavily advertised. Food promotion can: impact children’s nutritional knowledge and perception 
of a healthy diet through influencing their food preferences, purchasing choice and requests;. 
This, in turn, affects their consumption behaviours and diet-related health status, making food 
promotion a significant independent determinant of food behaviours and health status.29 There is 
modest evidence that television advertising influences children’s food and beverage preferences, 
and strong evidence that advertising impacts children’s purchase choice and requests.30  
In recent years, digital marketing has exploded, fuelled by an increase in the number and 
sophistication of interactive games, the rise of social media, data collection, profiling, and 
smartphones, as well as mobile marketing.31 This form of marketing may be even more 
successful at tapping into emotional or sub-conscious choices,32 allowing for more engagement 
than traditional media.33 Digital marketing can be cheaper for companies than broadcast, 
allowing food companies to target untapped developing markets through aggressive marketing 
campaigns.34 Further, regulating digital marketing is more complex due to the borderless nature 
of the Internet,35 with regulatory systems designed for broadcast media failing to encompass 
online media.36  
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Ivana Kolčić, 'Double burden of malnutrition: A silent driver of double burden of disease in low– and middle–
income countries' (2012) 2 JGH 1. 
25 Jervase Ekezie and others, 'Impact of urbanization on obesity, anthropometric profile and blood pressure in the 
Igbos of Nigeria' (2011) 3 NAJMS 242. 
26 David Stuckler and others, 'Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in Increased Consumption of 
Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol, and Tobacco' (2012) 9 PLOS Medicine 1. 
27 John Cawley, 'The economics of childhood obesity' (2010) 29 Health Aff 364. 
28 Tim Lobstein and others, 'Child and adolescent obesity: part of a bigger picture' (2015) 385 Lancet 2510. 
29 Gerard Hastings and others, ‘Review of research on the effects of food promotion to children’ (University of 
Strathclyde 2003); AE Matthews, 'Children and obesity: a pan-European project examining the role of food 
marketing' (2008) 18 Eur J Public Health 7. 
30 G Cairns and others, 'Systematic reviews of the evidence on the nature, extent and effects of food marketing to 
children. A retrospective summary' (2013) 62 Appetite 209. 
31 Kathryn Montgomery and others, ‘The New Threat of Digital Marketing (2012) 59(3) Pediatr Clin North Am 661. 
32 Kathryn Montgomery and others, Food Marketing in the Digital Age: A Conceptual Framework and Agenda for 
Research (Center for Digital Democracy 2011). 
33 R Bailey, K Wise, and P Bolls, ‘How Avatar Customizability Affects Children's Arousal and Subjective Presence 
During Junk Food-Sponsored Online Video Games’ (2009) 12(3) Cyberpsychol Behav.  
34 Consumers International, ‘The Junk Food Trap: marketing unhealthy food in Asia and the Pacific Region’ 
(Consumers International 2008). 
35 WHO Europe, Tackling food marketing to children in a digital world: trans-disciplinary perspectives (WHO 
Europe 2016) 20. 
36 Hans J Kleinsteuber, ‘The Internet between Regulation and Governance’ in Christian Möller and Arnaud 
Amouroux (eds) The Media Freedom Internet Cookbook (OSCE 2004) 62-3. 
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Accordingly, international bodies recommend that states limit marketing to prevent 
childhood obesity.37 WHO has issued non-binding guidelines on best practice: the set of 
recommendations on marketing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children.38 Still, reviews 
highlight that no state has effectively and fully implemented the WHO recommendations.39 
Instead of regulating, as explored below, governments often allow the food industry to self-
regulate with little oversight. 
2.2 WHO guidance on companies’ responsibilities 
Given the global reach of multinational food companies, WHO – with its constitutional mandate 
to direct and coordinate global health – can assist in defining the responsibilities of food 
companies.40 Under its Constitution, WHO can negotiate binding treaties with respect to any 
matter within the competence of the Organization, can issue binding regulations concerning 
specific concerns and make non-binding recommendations on any matter within its 
competence.41 In light of its Constitution, WHO has the competence to enact conventions and 
agree on recommendations related to promoting a healthy diet.42 WHO’s mandate includes 
stimulating and advancing work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases; promoting 
the improvement of nutrition; and developing, establishing and promoting international standards 
with respect to food. However, as we will see, obesity is highly political and contentious, making 
agreement among states on the need for binding law unlikely. 
WHO has not negotiated binding rules on obesity, but has issued relevant policy 
documents with recommendations to states and other stakeholders, including businesses.43 In its 
technical documents and policies, WHO consistently encourages states to work with the food 
industry through private sector engagement and partnerships44 ‘where appropriate’.45 At the same 
time, co-operation with the private sector should ensure ‘avoidance of potential conflicts of 
interest’.46 Yet, WHO’s approach to food companies is too open-ended to promote effective 
change. The Global Strategy on Diet and Physical Activity (hereafter, the Strategy) – arguably 
the most important WHO policy document in the context of obesity - recommends that the food 
industry: promotes healthy diets and physical activity in line with national and international 
standards; limits fats, sugars and salts in products; develops affordable, healthy and nutritious 
                                                 
37 UN General Assembly, ‘Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases’ (2011) A/66/2, 43(f)(g).  
38 WHO, Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children (WHO 
2010); WHO, A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-
Alcoholic Beverages to Children (WHO 2012). 
39 Stefanie Vandevijvere and others, 'Progress achieved in restricting the marketing of high-fat, sugary and salty 
food and beverage products to children' (2016) 94 Bull World Health Organ 540. 
40 Constitution of the World Health Organization (adopted 22 July 1946, entry into force 4 July 1948) 14 UNTS 185 
art 2(a). 
41 Ibid arts 19-23. 
42 Ibid, arts 19, 23. See also, Consumers International and others, ‘Open Letter to Margaret Chan And José Graziano 
Da Silva Ahead of The Second International Conference On Nutrition’ (ICN2) (17 November 2014). 
43 For instance: WHO, Global Strategy on Diet Physical Activity and Health (WHO 2004); WHO, Global Action 
Plan for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 2013-2020 (WHO 2013). 
44 ECHO (n 11) 36. 
45 Global Action Plan (n 43) 22. 
46 WHA ‘Global strategy on diet, physical activity and health’ (22 May 2004) WHA57.17 5(6). 
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choices; provides adequate information to consumers and authorities, including labels and 
evidence based health claims; and practices responsible marketing.47  
These broad standards can conflate the roles of the state and companies, ignoring the 
inherent conflicts between the aims of food industry profit making by selling as much food as 
possible, as well as the aims of the Strategy to promote a healthy diet and discouraging excessive 
consumption.48 Further, the recommendations in the Strategy do not clarify states’ role in 
navigating the conflicts. States are mainly encouraged to support the informed consumer, not to 
regulate the private actors that supply the food contributing to this epidemic. Important concepts 
like ‘healthy’, ‘adequate’, and ‘appropriate’ are undefined. In later documents, WHO has been 
more explicit, calling for reductions in salt, saturated fats, free and added sugars, elimination of 
transfats and limits to portion sizes.49 Further, WHO has produced regional nutrient profiles to 
guide regulators in determining what food should not be marketed to children.50 
Yet, WHO’s anticipated Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) 
focuses on risk assessment and management within WHO, not governing corporate practices.51  
The WHO Department of Nutrition for Health and Development’s 2016 recommendations are of 
more guidance, highlighting transparency, participation, and accountability, including: civil 
society engagement, exclusion criteria for partnerships, legislation and governance in the 
development of nutrient profiles, pooling industry funding to finance research and policies, 
publishing communications between the industry and government, and monitoring industry 
progress.52 While useful, the advice is not binding nor has the World Health Assembly (WHA) 
endorsed it, limiting the recommendations’ import for now. WHA should discuss and ideally 
endorse these recommendations. By avoiding tackling these conflicts head on, WHO is failing to 
ensure the highest attainable standard of global health.  WHO must do more to guide companies 
on acting in line with the aims of WHO - ‘the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health’. 
                                                 
47 Strategy 13-14; Global Action Plan 98. 
48 See, for example, K Brownell and K Warner ‘The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and 
Millions Died. How Similar Is Big Food?’ (2009) 87(1) Milbank Q 259; Jonathan Gornall, Sugar: spinning a 
web of influence (2015) BMJ 350. Since the submission of this article, these conflicts have been addressed in 
detail in Amandine Garde, Bill Jeffery and Neville Rigby, ‘Implementing the WHO Recommendations whilst 
avoiding real, perceived or potential conflicts of interest’ EJRR (2017) 8(2) 237. 
49 Global Action Plan (n 43) 33. For a detailed analysis of WHO’s instruments in the field of obesity, see, K Ó 
Cathaoir, M Hartlev, C Brassart-Olsen, ‘Global Health Law and Obesity: towards a complementary approach of 
public health and human rights law’ in GL Burci and B Toebes (eds), Research Handbook on Global Health Law 
(Routledge, 2018). 
50 WHO Nutrient Profile Model for the Western Pacific Region: A tool to protect children from food marketing 
(2016); WHO Nutrient Profile Model for South-East Asia Region. To implement the set of recommendations on 
the marketing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children (2017). 
51 WHA, ‘Framework of engagement with non-State actors’ (28 May 2016) WHA69.10; Kent Buse, Sarah Hawkes, 
‘Sitting on the FENSA: WHO engagement with industry’ (2016) 388(10043) Lancet 446; WHO Global 
Coordination Mechanism on the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, ‘Final report and 
recommendations from the Working Group on ways and means of encouraging Member States and non-State 
actors to realize the commitment included in paragraph 44 of the Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting 
of the United Nations General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases’ (WHO 
May 2016). 
52 WHO, ‘Addressing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the planning and delivery of nutrition programmes at 
country level’ (WHO Geneva 2016) 28. 
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Food companies can benefit from playing a role in preventing obesity, as encouraged by 
the Strategy. Demand for ‘healthy’ food is growing, meaning there is an increasing incentive for 
‘big food’ to take nutrition seriously to maintain its consumer base. The organic food market in 
the EU doubled from 2004 – 2015 to 24 billion euro.53 ‘Better for you’ snacks constitute a 
growing market in the US, bringing in $19.3 billion of sales in 2015.54 Further, reputation is a 
strong incentive. The food industry risks becoming ‘the new tobacco’, which will likely affect 
profits and encourage public support for government regulation. Governments agree, under 
article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, to protect their public 
health policies ‘from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance 
with national law’.55 However, tobacco is a single harmful product, while food encompasses 
healthy and unhealthy products. Ultimately, by claiming to be a partner in obesity prevention, the 
food industry can argue that regulation is unnecessary and shape policies in a manner favourable 
to their interests. 
Indeed, far from acting as the partner envisaged in the Strategy, food and beverage 
companies often oppose and obstruct government regulation.56 For instance, the sugar industry 
lobbied against the WHO’s technical report on Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic 
Disease, resulting in a watering down of (non-binding) recommendations.57 Soda companies, in 
particular, are gaining a negative reputation for using tactics akin to those of tobacco companies: 
they profess devotion to health and well-being, divert attention to physical activity, promote 
“better for you products” and create coalitions to reframe their message.58 In 2015, the New York 
Times revealed that Coca-Cola funded a research centre that advocated physical exercise to 
prevent obesity and downplayed the role of diet.59 In 2016, archival research showed that the 
sugar industry paid scientists to deliver research favourable to its interests.60 In general, industry-
funded research has been found less likely to identify a link between soda consumption and 
weight gain.61  
For these reasons, partnerships with industry have been critiqued, among which is the 
criticism that the industry’s fiduciary duties to generate profits will outweigh public health.62 It 
has been suggested that, to be effective, partnerships should focus on environment-based 
interventions, not individual behaviours.63 Hawkes recommends that partnerships with the food 
                                                 
53 IFOAM EU Group, ‘Organic in Europe: Prospects and Developments 2016’ (IFOAM EU Group 2016). 
54 Packaged Facts, ‘Healthy-Ingredient Snacks in the U.S.’ (2nd edn, Packaged Facts 2016). 
55 WHO, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (adopted 21 May 2003, entered into force 27 February 2005) 
2302 UNTS 166. 
56 Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents ‘Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine 
Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organisation’ (WHO July 2000). 
57 Kelley Lee, World Health Organization (Global Institutions, Routledge 2009) 118-9.  
58 Marion Nestle, Soda Politics (Oxford University Press 2015) 107-113. 
59 Anahad O’Connor, 'Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for Obesity Away From Bad Diets' (New York 
Times, 2015) <http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-shift-blame-for-
obesity-away-from-bad-diets/?_r=0> accessed 15 May 2017. 
60 CE Kearns, LA Schmidt and SA Glantz, 'Sugar industry and coronary heart disease research: A historical analysis 
of internal industry documents' (2016) 176 JAMA Internal Medicine 1680. 
61 Maira Bes-Rastrollo and others, 'Financial Conflicts of Interest and Reporting Bias Regarding the Association 
between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews' (2014) 10 
PLOS Medicine 1. 
62 Y Freedhoff, ‘The food industry is neither friend, nor foe, nor partner’ (2014) 15(1) Obes Rev 6.  
63 Vivica I Kraak and Mary Story, ‘A Public Health Perspective on Healthy Lifestyles and Public–Private 
Partnerships for Global Childhood Obesity Prevention’ (2010) 110(2) J Am Diet Assoc 192-200. 
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industry are most likely to be effective where both par ties stand to gain, and where the 
partnership does not obstruct the broader strategy.64 She suggests that public-private partnerships 
should address a clear goal, map the parties’ interests, and be monitored.65 Stuckler and Nestle, 
on the other hand, argue that there is an inherent conflict of interest as any partnership must 
create a profit for the food industry and unhealthy products are more profitable. Therefore, there 
is little incentive for companies to shift product category by choice.66 Garde and others concur 
that food companies have ‘no incentive to voluntarily curb marketing for unhealthy food to 
children, except to foil efforts to enact potentially far-reaching legislation in this field’.67 
In light of weak WHO guidelines, the next section analyses whether food and beverage 
companies have direct responsibilities towards population health and diet under IHRL. My 
approach is that human rights can support and reinforce the realisation of public health goals, 
namely the prevention of childhood obesity. The connection between children’s rights and 
obesity is increasingly recognised; in its recent report, ECHO specifically draws on children’s 
rights, including the right to health.68 While WHO technical documents and recommendations 
are not binding, they could be used to interpret responsibilities under binding law. Further, 
unanimous political declarations from bodies made up by states, like the UN and WHA, are 
indicative of broad agreement and therefore persuasive. In order to pursue realisation of the right 
to health, human rights bodies should thereby draw on WHO technical documents to concretise 
broadly phrased human rights responsibilities.  
3 Companies under International Human Rights Law 
Since the 1970s, states, academics and civil society have discussed whether companies 
(particularly transnational entities) have or should have responsibilities to individuals under 
IHRL. International law is classically state-centric - states negotiate and ratify international 
treaties, and thereby consent to be bound by the provisions. Yet, while international law remains 
anchored to the nation state, globalisation has catapulted companies’ transnational power, and 
undermined states’ regulatory capacity.69 This governance gap allows companies to violate 
human rights and dignity, often without sanction.70  
Despite these developments in global governance, states have been reluctant to impose 
binding human rights obligations on companies at the international level. Efforts to impose 
taxing standards, such as the proposed UN Norms on Transnational Corporations and Other 
                                                 
64 Corinna Hawkes, ‘Working Paper on Public-Private Partnerships for Health: High Level Group Working Paper on 
Public Private Partnerships for Health’ (2008) 20-1. 
65 Ibid 21-2. 
66 David Stuckler and Marion Nestle, ‘Big Food, Food Systems, and Global Health’ (2012) 9(6) PLOS Medicine 2.  
67 Garde, Jeffrey, Rigby (n 48) 240. 
68 ECHO (n 11) 8. See also, Global Action Plan (n 43) 12. For a detailed analysis of the interplay between the WHO 
recommendations and children’s rights, see Amandine Garde, Seamus Byrne, Nikhil Gokani and Ben Murphy, 
‘For a children’s rights approach to obesity prevention: the key role of an effective implementation of the WHO 
Recommendations’ (2017) 8(2) EJRR 327. See also, Amandine Garde and others, A Child Rights-Based 
Approach to Food Marketing: A Guide for Policy Makers (UNICEF, 2018). 
69 See, for example, Stephen J Kobrin, ‘The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global 
Economy’ in John H Dunning (ed) Governments, Globalization, and International Business (OUP 1999); David 
Antony Detomasi, ‘The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: Modelling Global Public Policy 
Networks’ (2007) 71(3) J Bus Ethics 321. 
70 Mahmood Monshipouri, Claude E Welch and Evan  T Kennedy, 'Multinational  Corporations  and  the Ethics of 
Global  Responsibility: Problems  and  Possibilities' (2003) 25 Hum Rts Q 965, 973. 
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Business Enterprises ended in failure.71 Still, advocates have been inspired by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which addresses ‘every individual and every organ of 
society’.72 Under the UDHR, everyone has duties to the community and no group should engage 
in activities or acts that seek to destroy any rights and freedoms found within the Declaration.73 
Although the UDHR is non-binding, it is often considered part of customary international law 
due to consistent state practice and opinio juris.74 Still, even if companies had binding 
obligations under the UDHR, there is no mechanism for monitoring or enforcing these at 
international level. 
Further, as companies stand to benefit from engaging with human rights, their 
responsibilities must be clear and incisive. Businesses often adopt a human rights strategy due to 
public pressure, to reduce the threat of litigation, or the desire to boost their reputation.75 
Therefore, vague guidance that allows companies to benefit reputationally by association with 
human rights, while doing very little to change corporate practices, should be avoided as only 
companies, not rights holders, will gain.76 Accordingly, I analyse the strategies below from the 
standpoint that companies must justify (and earn) the benefits of perceived human rights 
compliance with corporate transformation. Treating human rights as a mere means of corporate 
social responsibility runs contrary to the essence of human rights and the protection of human 
dignity. 
3.1 Existing business and human rights guidelines 
The central guidelines on business and human rights frame companies as holding responsibilities 
to respect human rights based on social expectations – not binding obligations enforced by law.77 
Under the Global Compact, companies make two simple commitments specific to human rights: 
to support and respect all human rights recognised under the UDHR, and not to be complicit in 
rights abuses.78 The UNGP arguably go further; companies should respect all rights under the 
International Bill of Human Rights,79 by avoiding infringements and addressing any adverse 
impacts. The UNGP, although non-binding, is the most authoritative standard as it has been 
endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, which is made up of states. The UNGP can further 
be interpreted in light of the Children’s Principles that build on the UNGP from a child-centred 
outlook: companies should respect children’s rights through preventing harm, and support 
children’s rights through active engagement.80  
                                                 
71 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, adopted 13 Aug. 2003, Sub-Commission on the Promotion & Protect. of Hum. Rts. Res. 
2003/12, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts, Sub- Commission on the Promotion & Protect. of Hum. Rts., 
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). 
72 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR). 
73 UDHR arts 29 & 30. 
74 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 art 
38(1)(b). 
75 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 197. 
76 Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business (CUP 2013) 229. 
77 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 62d Sess, Provisional Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. ./CN.4/2006/97 (2006). 
78 United Nations Global Compact (2000), principles 1, 2. 
79 UNGP (n 5) 12. 
80 Children's Principles (n 5) Principle 3.  
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What does it mean for a company to respect and support children’s rights? Clearly, the 
responsibilities that companies voluntarily undertake are not onerous. Under the Global 
Compact, companies must make a leadership commitment to follow the principles, and produce 
an annual Communication on Progress (CoP).81 Following the UNGP, companies should avoid 
infringing human rights and address adverse impacts through ‘prevention, mitigation and, where 
appropriate, remediation’.82 Yet, the UNGP do not define what constitutes an adverse impact, 
meaning that compliance relies on adequately defined human rights norms. The UNGP outline 
specific steps to meet these responsibilities, including a policy commitment, human rights due-
diligence and processes to enable remediation.83 The Children’s Principles additionally call for 
child-sensitive remediation of adverse impacts.84  
None of these standards amount to legally binding obligations. The agreements are not 
subject to monitoring or review, nor do they carry sanctions - besides reputational 
embarrassment or expulsion. The latter sanctions depend on third parties to identify and publicise 
non-compliance. Companies have wide latitude in determining whether, how, and when to 
address their adverse impact on human rights.  Businesses may thereby use UN-associated 
principles to boost their profile, while not effectively addressing their negative impact on 
children’s rights. Further, practice suggests that although many companies adopt human rights 
policies, the majority do not conform to the UNGP.85  
Driven by the lack of specificity, Shift, a non-profit organisation, and Mazars, an 
international accountancy firm, developed a UNGP ‘Reporting Framework’ to guide companies 
in meeting the UNGP, based on two years of multi-stakeholder engagement. The Framework 
(Shift framework) introduces the concept of ‘salient human rights issues’: ‘human rights that 
stand out because they are at risk of the most severe negative impact through the company’s 
activities or business relationships’.86 Following this approach, companies are not expected to 
address their impact on every right, but to identify the human rights that are most at risk by their 
actions in terms of scale (the severity of the impact), scope (the number of people that are 
affected) and remediability. 
 
3.2 A right to freedom from obesity? 
Although non-binding, existing standards on business and human rights call upon 
companies to respect and support children’s rights. But what do these responsibilities entail in 
the context of childhood obesity prevention? While states must respect, protect and fulfil the 
rights enshrined in the treaties they ratify, companies should ‘identify and assess’ their actual or 
potential impacts on human rights, including through consultation with affected groups and 
stakeholders.87 Further, the UNGP do not articulate how companies should respect rights, and 
what conduct, if any, amounts to a violation of their responsibilities. This section analyses 
                                                 
81 Global Compact, ‘UN Global Compact Policy on Communicating Progress’ (2013). 
82 UNGP (n 5) principle 11. 
83 Ibid principle 15. 
84 Children’s Principles (n 5) 16. 
85 Susan Ariel Aaronson, 'Re-righting Business": John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human 
Rights Standards for Transnational Firms' (2013) 35(2) Hum R Q 333, 356. 
86 Shift/ Mazars, ‘UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’ (2015). 
87 UNGP (n 5) principle 18. 
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companies’ responsibilities in light of the treaties that enshrine relevant rights, guidelines on 
business and human rights, relevant general comments, and reports of Special Rapporteurs. 
Human rights treaties recognise rights pertaining to healthy diet and obesity, yet not 
through the prism of companies’ impact or duties. The CRC and ICESCR enshrine the rights to 
health and adequate food, which have a clear link to obesity, but only states can ratify the 
treaties. Under these treaties, states undertake obligations to combat disease, malnutrition, and 
epidemics, including through the provision of adequate food and clean water, and to develop 
preventative health-care.88 States parties must take steps, inter alia, to promote the healthy 
development of the child, and the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases.89 Although the right to adequate food is classically linked to 
hunger in the 2014 Rome Declaration on Nutrition, member states of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and WHO reaffirm ‘the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient 
and nutritious food’ in the context of childhood overweight and obesity.90  
Drawing on the Shift framework, food companies do not have to consider their impact on 
nutrition rights— they can focus upon selected human rights. Yet, the discussion in section 2.1 
suggests that food and beverage companies have adverse impacts on the rights to health and 
adequate food, namely through producing, selling, and promoting ultra-processed foods, 
displacing healthy diets, targeting children through marketing unhealthy food, and lobbying 
against and obstructing evidence-based regulation. If we consider these impacts in terms of 
severity and scope, the rights to health and adequate food are arguably salient due to the depth of 
the obesity epidemic and the masses affected.  
Further, although the Children’s Principles also do not require companies to mitigate 
their adverse impact on the rights to adequate food and health specifically, unlike the UNGP, 
they highlight the impact of marketing of unhealthy food on children. Yet, marketing to children 
is not identified as contrary to children’s rights per se. Instead, companies should ensure that 
their marketing practices do not have an adverse impact on children’s rights. The accompanying 
Child Impact Assessment Guidelines encourage companies to make healthy food accessible in 
supermarkets, and avoid unhealthy food marketing in schools and ‘child-friendly’ sporting 
events.91 The Children’s Principles also posit that companies should comply with WHO 
recommendations on marketing.92  
The recognition of the WHO recommendations on marketing reinforces the argument that 
public health recommendations can and should inform human rights. Still, like the WHO 
recommendations, the Principles are not binding. The Children’s Principles are further less 
persuasive than the UNGP as they have not been endorsed by states. Further, terms like ‘healthy’ 
and ‘child friendly’ are undefined, allowing companies wide latitude. Additionally, the 
Children’s Principles fail to draw attention to unhealthy food marketing as inherently adverse to 
children’s rights, a conclusion that is merited in light of the evidence presented in section 2.1. 
                                                 
88 CRC art 24.2(c). 
89 ICESCR art 12. 
90 ICESCR art 11; ‘Rome Declaration on Nutrition’ (Second International Conference on Nutrition FAO/ WHO, 19-
21 November 2014). 
91 Danish Institute for Human Rights, UNICEF, ‘Children’s Rights in Impact Assessments: A guide for integrating 
child rights into impact assessments and taking action for children’ (December 2013) 38. 
92 Children’s Principles (n 5) 26. 
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Further, food companies’ responsibilities could be informed by the general comments of 
UN committees tasked with monitoring the implementation of the CRC and ICESCR .93 General 
comments, although not binding, are influential sources upon which civil society, businesses and 
states can draw. However, the CESCR primarily addresses states’ obligations, with fleeting 
reference to companies’ responsibility to respect Covenant rights. 94 Conversely, the CRC 
Committee goes too far at times - claiming that all businesses have obligations of due diligence 
with respect to children’s rights, obligations to carry out their operations in compliance with 
children’s rights,95 and not to undermine states’ abilities to meet their obligations.96 This 
interpretation of companies’ duties is not principled, in that current international practice 
recognises companies as only having responsibilities – not obligations.97 Elsewhere, the CRC 
Committee has more accurately claimed that companies should limit unhealthy food marketing 
to children and comply with WHO standards (although it does not mention the WHO 
recommendations specifically).98 
While the committees have offered limited guidance, the Special Rapporteur on the right 
to health and the Special Rapporteur on the right to food have made more direct 
recommendations to food companies. The former Special Rapporteur on the right to food advised 
companies to: 
• Comply with WHO recommendations 
• Avoid nutrition based interventions where diets are sustainable 
• Prioritise local solutions with the objective of sustainable diets 
• Move away from food high in salt, fat and sugar (HFSS) and towards healthier 
foods.99 
  In 2016 the current Special Rapporteur on the right to food called for internationally 
agreed guidelines on public/private partnership and independent monitoring of accountability.100 
The Special Rapporteur on the right to health has reiterated several of the recommendations, 
calling on companies to: 
• Adopt adequate nutritional labelling and comply with national guidelines, 
• Avoid marketing, promoting and advertising HFSS foods (especially to children) 
• Improve nutritional content of foods 
                                                 
93 Ando N ‘General Comments/ Recommendations’ (Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 2010) 
< http://ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/general_comments_recommendations_empil.pdf> accessed 15 May 
2017. 
94 CESCR, General comment No 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities (10 August 2017) E/C.12/GC/24 para 5. 
95 CRC Committee, ‘General comment No 15: The right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health’ (17 April 2013) CRC/C/GC/15 para 75.  
96 CRC Committee, ‘General comment No 16, State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on 
children’s rights’ (17 April 2013) CRC/C/GC/16 para 8. 
97 See, John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (OUP 2012). 
98 ‘General comment No 15’ (n 95) para 81. 
99 Olivier  De Schutter, ‘Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food’ (26 December 2011) 
A/HRC/19/59 paras 51(a)-(d). 
100 Special Rapporteur on the right to food, ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food’ (3 August 
2016) A/71/282 para 99(e). 
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• Increase transparency on nutritional information and avoid misleading claims 
• Avoid undermining public health efforts.101 
While these recommendations are non-binding, they recognise that food and beverage 
companies have a responsibility to mitigate their adverse impact on children’s (and adults’) 
rights to health and adequate food. They provide detail on what it means to respect and support 
rights in the context of obesity. Yet, as discussed in section 4, there is an overlap between some 
of these responsibilities and states’ obligations. The next section analyses whether selected food 
and beverage companies have operationalised the non-binding responsibilities discussed in this 
section in their human rights policies to date.  
3.3 Selected companies’ human rights policies 
In light of the guidance from human rights bodies discussed above, I now analyse a 
selection of human rights policies to establish whether major food and beverage companies 
assess their adverse impacts on the right to adequate food and the right to health in the context of 
obesity. In analysing companies’ responsibilities, I am guided by Shift’s framework which 
recommends that companies determine which rights are “salient”. However, salience still leaves 
companies wide discretion. Therefore, in assessing which rights are “salient”, I argue that 
companies should be guided by what Bilchitz terms the “functional objection”. According to 
Bilchitz, the Ruggie Principles suggest that companies’ responsibilities should ‘track the nature 
and function that the entity has in our society’.102 Thus, companies’ responsibilities should be 
connected to their role and aims as this is where companies can have the greatest impact 
(whether positive or negative). Therefore, ‘an understanding of the function of particular entities 
is… crucial in delineating the nature and ambit of their obligations’.103 
Following this approach, companies’ human rights policies should analyse the 
companies’ impact on the rights closely linked to their aims and functions. Companies should 
not be free to determine “salient issues”. As a company is a profit-making entity, it is logical that 
it will avoid exposing itself to losses and decline to voluntarily limit profitable activities. 
Applying this paradigm to food companies (as profit-making entities with the main objective of 
selling food), and given the link between unhealthy diet and obesity and other non-
communicable diseases, companies should examine the impact of their products on individuals’ 
and communities’ rights to health and adequate food in order to effectively respect human rights. 
This requires companies to engage with the adverse impacts of their products and the potential 
rights violations that can flow from their activities - not to merely pick the rights that they 
consider easiest to address. 
Yet, the food and beverage companies reviewed do not engage with the effect of their 
products on the right to health or the right to adequate food. Despite the close connection 
between the rights and the societal role of the companies, food and beverage companies do not 
identify the direct link between producing and selling food, and individuals’ rights to adequate 
food and health, as a human rights responsibility. Instead, the companies focus on employment-
centred rights and duties, such as prohibition of child labour, land rights and working 
                                                 
101 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’ (1 April 2014) A/HRC/26/31 paras 66(a)-(e). 
102 David Bilchitz, 'Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental Rights Obligations?' (2010) Theoria 1, 5. 
103 Ibid. 
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conditions.104 Food companies’ approach to human rights suggest that by protecting their 
workers, they have done their part to respect human rights; the effects of their products are for 
the consumer to weigh and decide whether to purchase. 
This minimalist approach echoes the informed-consumer paradigm, whereby consumers, 
not the producer, are primarily responsible for their health and food choices.105 Following this 
approach, individuals are conceived as rational choice maximisers who are able to understand 
and evaluate information, and act on the information in the interests of their health when making 
purchases. In the context of obesity, such an approach is underscored by individual responsibility 
and the politics of blame. Yet, obesity is more complex than simply individual behaviour.106 
Further, behavioural economics questions the extent to which individuals make rational choices 
in their long-term interests.107  
However, while “big food” companies do not assess obesity as a human rights 
responsibility, they recognise that obesity risks their profitability. Companies thereby analyse 
obesity as an economic, but not a human rights, impact. For instance, Coca-Cola sees obesity as 
a threat that may lead consumers to change purchasing habits, and cause legislatures to regulate 
labelling and marketing.108 Similarly, PepsiCo concedes that a public impression that it is not 
meeting its targets in reducing unhealthy advertising and reformulating products could have an 
adverse effect on its business.109 The company further recognises that it has a responsibility to 
address obesity and thereby supports active lifestyle initiatives.110 General Mills draws specific 
attention to overweight and obesity, and claims to reformulate its products to support 
consumers.111  
Accordingly, food and beverage companies do not avoid engagement with the nutritional 
aspects of food or health, but approach these factors separately from human rights. Companies 
are aware of their relationship to individuals’ access to adequate food and their enjoyment of the 
right to health, although they do not phrase it as such. Instead, obesity has been framed as a 
public relations exercise and thereby a marketing opportunity. For instance, General Mills 
recognises ‘healthy and affordable food’ in the context of food security, health and nutrition 
wellness, but not human rights. It reports that it has reduced the amount of salt and sugar in its 
products and supports community efforts to live a healthful life.112 Similarly, although Coca-
                                                 
104 General Mills, 'Policy on Human Rights' (2016); Coca-Cola, ‘Human Rights Policy’ (2014); McDonald's, ‘The 
Good Business Report’ (McDonald’s Sustainability Update, 2015); PepsiCo, ‘Sustainability Report 2014 
Performance with Purpose’ (2015); Coca-Cola, ‘2014/2015 Sustainability Report’ (2015); Mars, ‘Human Rights 
Policy’ (2016). 
105 Paul Cairney and Donley Studlar, ‘Obesity Prevention Policy: From Harm Regulation Towards a Neo-
Prohibitionist Regime?’ (2015 University of Strathclyde). 
106 CA Roberto and others, 'Patchy progress on obesity prevention: emerging examples, entrenched barriers, and 
new thinking' (2015) 385 Lancet 2400. 
107 Richard H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness 
(Penguin Books 2009) 6; CA Roberto and I Kawachi, ‘Use of Psychology and Behavioral Economics to Promote 
Healthy Eating’ (2014) 47(6) Am J Prev Med 832. 
108 The Coca-Cola Company, ‘United States Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K’ (2015). 
109 Pepsico, ‘2015 Annual Report’ (2016) 19; Mondelez International, ‘Form 10-K Annual Report’ (2016) 18. 
110 Pepsico, ‘Performance with Purpose 2025 Agenda: PepsiCo Sustainability Report 2015’ (2016) 3. 
111 General Mills, ‘Global Responsibility 2015’ (2016) 18. McDonald’s are more discrete but mention that 
customer’s perceptions of nutritional content of the food poses a risk, McDonald's, ‘Annual Report’ (2015) 4. 
112 General Mills, ‘Global Responsibility 2016’ (2016) 93-102; Mars recognise obesity as a challenge, Mars, 
‘Principles in Action Summary 2013’ (2014) 9. 
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Cola does not consider the effect of its products on its consumers as right to health or food 
issues, it details product reformulation in its separate ‘Sustainability’ Report.113 ‘Well-being’, 
which is separated from human rights, includes taking measures to offer low calorie options, 
nutrition information, supporting physical activity and avoiding marketing directed at children 
under 12 years.114 PepsiCo also reports on product reformulation and portion size reduction in its 
Sustainability Report.115 Like its competitors, Mondelez International reports on ‘well-being’ 
separately from human rights. It details efforts to introduce new (self-defined) ‘better for you’ 
products and claims that 25 % of its sales come from ‘better for you’ products.116 Mc Donald’s 
invests in, and supports, ‘making physical activity fun’ by promoting exercise through 
sponsorship of events at local and global level.117 Mars recognises obesity as a concern and 
pursues information provision, food reformulation and community outreach, such as cooking 
lessons.118  
Nestlé recognises broader human rights concerns than the other companies, having 
commissioned the Danish Institute for Human Rights to conduct an analysis of its human rights 
impact in eight distinct areas, including marketing practices.119 Product safety (although not 
nutrition) is recognised as a human rights concern, suggesting that there could be scope for 
expanding this interpretation to include nutrition standards.120 The company further identifies 
employee health and well-being as a human rights responsibility, which could be expanded to 
consider consumers’ health.121 Finally, Nestlé acknowledges water as a basic human right.122 
Nestlé’s efforts to demonstrate commitment to human rights is a response to the criticism it 
received for aggressively marketing infant formula and interfering with the right to water 
through buying water permits.123  
 
Table 1: Selected Human Rights Policies 
Company 
reviewed 
Consideration of human rights Corporate Social responsibilities (CSR) related 
to obesity 
Coca-Cola Non-existent, but obesity threatens 
profits. 
Child labour; work hours, wages 
and benefits; forced labour and 
human trafficking; workplace 
security; safe and healthy 
workplace, diversity; freedom of 
Sustainability: 
• Product reformulation 
Well-being: 
▪ Offer low calorie options  
▪ Provide nutrition  
▪ information  
▪ Support physical activity  
                                                 
113 Coca-Cola, 2014/2015 ‘Sustainability Report’. 
114 Ibid 6. 
115 PepsiCo, ‘Sustainability Report 2014’ 6. 
116 Mondelez International, ‘The Call for Wellbeing: Progress Report’ (2016) 33. 
117 Mc Donald's, ‘The Good Business Report’ 35. 
118 Mars, ‘Principles in Action Summary 2013’ 20. 
119 Nestle, ‘Nestlé in society: creating Shared Value and meeting our commitments 2015’ (2016) 225. 
120 Ibid 250-3. 
121 Ibid 269. 
122 Ibid 138. 
123 Nestle, 'Does Nestlé Chairman Peter Brabeck-Letmathe believe that water is a human right?' 
<http://www.nestle.com/ask-nestle/human-rights/answers/nestle-chairman-peter-brabeck-letmathe-believes-
water-is-a-human-right> accessed 15 May 2017. 
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association and collective 
bargaining; community engagement 
▪ Avoid marketing directed at children under 
12 years 
PepsiCo Freedom of association, right to 
water, land rights, vulnerable 
workers, working hours and wages, 
workplace safety 
Sustainability: 
• Product reformulation 
• Support active lifestyle 
• Reduce portion sizes 
General Mills Forced labor, child labor, and 
discrimination; safe and healthy 
working conditions; diversity; 
wage, work hours, overtime and 
benefits laws; freedom of 
association and collective 
bargaining; land rights; 
implementation of FPIC  
Responsibility: 
• Reformulation 
• Healthy & affordable food 
• Support communities to live ‘healthy life’ 
Mondelez Int’l Workers, direct suppliers & broader 
community should be treated with 
dignity 
Well-being: 
• Product reformulation 
Mc Donald’s Suppliers should respect rights, 
Freedom of Association, 
employment status, employment 
practices, anti-discrimination & fair 
treatment, working hours & rest 
days, underage labor, wages & 
benefits 
Good-Business: 
• Promoting physical activity incl 
sponsorship 
Mars Health (including environmental 
health, workplace health & safety) 
Workplace diversity / non-
discrimination 
Forced labour and human 
trafficking (including in supply 
chains) 
Sexual harassment 
Freedom of association and trade 
union rights 
Women 
Children (including child labour) 
Indigenous peoples 
Migrant workers 
Principles in Action: 
• information provision 
• food reformulation  
• community outreach 
Nestlé Freedom of association  
and collective bargaining; working 
time; workers’ accommodation; 
safety & health; living wage; child 
labour; land acquisition; access to 
water & sanitation; access to 
grievance mechanisms; data 
protection & privacy 
Nutrition, health & wellness: 
• Reformulation 
• Nutrition education 
• Clear information 
• Marketing 
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3.3.1 Voluntary marketing commitments 
Despite their responsibilities under the WHO recommendations, states often fail to perform a 
leadership role in regulating food marketing. Instead, companies self-regulate through collective 
and individual pledges. In light of globalisation, collective pledges, if effective, can contribute to 
protecting children’s rights across borders. Yet, the pledges are currently too weak to uphold 
children’s rights. Instead, food and beverage companies present a united front through mobilising 
as a collective, adding to their lobbying power and, consequently, to their ability to ward off 
regulation. 
For instance, major food and beverage companies created and agreed to a set of self-
regulatory principles under the prism of the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA).124 
Companies commit to advertise only products that meet nutritional criteria to children under 12 
(meaning programmes with an audience profile of which over 35 % are children). Accenture 
independently monitors these commitments on an annual basis. Yet, the IFBA has limitations: it 
only protects children under age 12, the audience threshold for advertising to be directed at 
children is high, and the companies that produce the products set the nutritional criteria. 
Furthermore, compliance and effective monitoring is weak. The 2015 compliance report claims 
97 % television compliance – meaning over 14,000 examples of non-compliance were identified. 
In contrast, British regulations on food marketing enshrine a more protective model that requires 
pre-clearance, meaning that children are exposed to less harmful advertising in the first instance, 
and are not solely reliant on complaints.125  Returning to the IFBA, while 100 % print 
compliance was reported, this was only in print directly targeting children under 12 – not print 
that children actually read, such as magazines designed for teenagers. Also, the system of 
monitoring internet communications only measures a sample of sites directly targeting children, 
meaning that a significant amount of advertising that children are exposed to is most likely not 
captured.126 If monitoring is difficult due to challenges in determining how targeting is defined, it 
must be similarly problematic for companies to determine where and when advertising may be 
placed. 
Additionally, the companies reviewed in this article make individual marketing 
commitments on top of collective pledges, suggesting that some companies recognise the 
insufficiency of collective pledges. Individual voluntary commitments that go beyond the 
collective pledges include: prohibiting all direct advertising to children under 12 and targeting 
parents instead;127 not using celebrities or licensed characters in marketing aimed at children;128 
only using licensed characters and endorsements where products meet set nutritional criteria;129 
more narrowly defining when children are the targets of adverting (i.e. where 25 % of the 
audience are under 12,130 in contrast to 35 % children as defined by the IFBA).131 However, 
                                                 
124 The member companies are The Coca-Cola Company, Ferrero, General Mills, Grupo Bimbo, Kellogg’s, Mars, 
McDonald’s, Mondelēz International, Nestlé, PepsiCo and Unilever. (<www.ifballiance.org/about/members/>). 
There a number of other regional pledges, such as the EU Pledge http://www.eu-pledge.eu/  
125 British Heart Foundation and CFC, ‘Protecting Children from Unhealthy Food Marketing’ (Sustain 2008) 24. 
126 Ibid 4. 
127 Mondelez International, ‘The Call for Wellbeing: Progress Report’ 40; Coca-Cola, ‘The Coca-Cola Company’s 
Responsible Marketing Policy’ (September 2015). 
128 Mars, ‘Global Marketing Code for Food, Chocolate, Confections and Gum’ 3. 
129 Ibid 2. 
130 Ibid 8. 
131 PepsiCo, ‘PepsiCo Policy on Responsible Advertising to Children. 
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these commitments are undermined where companies apply weak nutritional criteria.132 On the 
one hand, the fact that some companies voluntarily go further than others may prompt a race to 
the top, where companies seek to boost their reputation by voluntarily employing progressively 
stricter standards. On the other hand, the patchwork of varying commitments undermines the 
universality of rights; children’s rights protection is dictated and defined by companies subject to 
their will, not regulators motivated by children’s rights. 
3.4 The unfulfilled promise of rights 
The decision of the food companies reviewed to focus on employment rights, not the 
rights that are central to their function in society exposes an effectiveness gap in the current 
approach to business and human rights. The analysis suggests that food companies are slow to 
analyse their impact on consumers’ health and access to adequate food through a human rights 
paradigm. Instead, the companies reviewed engage with nutrition as a form of corporate 
sustainability. 
Although several companies voluntarily restrict their marketing, including through global 
responsible marketing pledges, they design their own criteria, which are not sufficiently 
robust.133 Due to the inherent conflicts, this leads to varied, sub-optimal standards of protection. 
For example, the Access to Nutrition Index (a non-profit organisation) reports that Mars’ nutrient 
profiling only applies to its non-confectionary products, which make up a mere 5 % of its 
product portfolio.134 Further, where pledges narrowly define “advertising to children”, children 
continue to view high levels of advertising. Further, as companies’ voluntary commitments are 
mostly self-monitored, it is unclear whether they truly honour the spirit of their promises. Also, 
companies do not ensure accessible child-centred complaints mechanisms as recommended 
under the Children’s Principles. 
Using the language of the WHO Recommendations, limitations must effectively reduce 
children’s exposure to, and the power of, food marketing. Otherwise, as discussed above, 
companies can highlight their self-defined ‘responsible’ behaviour and benefit reputationally, 
without effectively limiting their promotional activities. Bryden et al. conclude that the evidence 
on voluntary agreements is too limited to claim that they are as effective as legislation.135  
Also, companies claim not to market to children, but often indirectly and directly 
promote their brand through sponsorship. As clear from table 1, some companies even portray 
this form of marketing as a beneficent means of combating obesity. Food brands further sponsor 
major international sporting events that attract billions of viewers. For instance, McDonald’s is 
among the brands that acts as official sponsor of the FIFA World Cup, while Coca-Cola sponsors 
both the Olympics and FIFA competitions. At local level, food industry sponsorship of sports for 
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young people is prevalent and comes more commonly from companies promoting unhealthy 
food than those promoting healthful products.136 This is not mere philanthropy; children recall 
sports’ shirts sponsors,137 and form a positive impression of the company.138 Indeed, the strategy 
is profitable: during the London 2012 Olympics, sales of sugary drinks increased by 10% in 
value and 8% in volume, compared with the same period the year before.139 It is even more 
duplicitous that the same companies lobby behind closed doors using science, civil society, 
media and policy.140 Leading soda companies extensively sponsor public health organisations, 
while lobbying against regulation.141  
This is contrary to a human rights approach. If companies are truly serious about 
investing in children’s health, they should do so without using their logos, and cease selling or 
promoting unhealthy products at events frequented by children. The Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Health recommends that states ban advertising, promotion and sponsorship of all events 
which could be attended by children by manufacturers of alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy 
foods.142 argued in the case of pharmaceutical companies,143 food companies should cease 
lobbying that undermines the right to health. Companies cannot write off their negative impact 
on nutrition rights and contribution to obesity by investing in exercise and sports. This is 
supported by the UNGP that prohibit instrumentalising rights.144 By claiming to support physical 
activity, companies present a commercial opportunity as corporate social responsibility. This 
reinforces the inaccurate claim that exercise alone will reverse obesity trends.  
It is significant that companies see health and nutrition through the lens of corporate 
social responsibility, not a responsibility to respect the human rights that are central to their 
profits. This allows corporate actors to address their adverse impact through beneficence, not 
fulfilment of responsibilities to their consumers defined in consultation with stakeholders. It is 
further in contrast to the approaches of human rights bodies, analysed in section 3.2, that 
underscore product reformulation, information and marketing bans as companies’ human rights 
responsibilities. The approach of food companies signals reluctance to acknowledge the potential 
conflicts between their products and human rights. Practically speaking, recognising product 
reformulation as a human rights impact could highlight states’ legal duties to regulate, which 
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companies are likely to wish to avoid. Further, drawing on ‘remediability’ within the Shift 
framework, these impacts may not be easy for companies that predominately sell unhealthy 
products to address without affecting profits.  
4 Ways forward 
This review has highlighted that, at present, food companies hold only non-binding 
responsibilities to respect rights, which lack effective oversight or sanctions where adverse 
impacts occur. Companies largely choose whether or not, and the extent to which, they engage 
with human rights, and they have too much latitude in determining which adverse impacts on 
human rights to address. This allows food companies to contribute to the obesity crisis, while 
simultaneously claiming to respect human rights. The present trajectory may worsen. As demand 
for healthy food grows in developed markets, food companies move their strategies to low and 
middle income economies. Even if states regulate more effectively in line with their obligation to 
protect, without universal protections, a fragmented legal landscape with different levels of 
protection from state to state will endure. Although global pledges, like the IFBA, could ensure 
global standards, they are currently too weak to provide for effective enjoyment of rights. 
Despite this bleak picture, several avenues to entrench greater commitment to human rights exist.   
Firstly, the United Nations is at an early stage of drafting an international treaty on 
business and human rights. This follows the 2014 Human Rights Council decision to establish an 
open-ended intergovernmental working group to explore a binding instrument on business and 
human rights.145 In October 2017, the intergovernmental working group presented elements for a 
draft legally binding instrument for substantive negotiation.146 Like the UNGP, the draft 
elements propose that states retain the primary obligations to respect, protect and fulfil rights, 
while businesses have a duty to respect all human rights.147 The function of the binding treaty, in 
contrast to the UNGP, is to establish legal liability for companies, and mechanisms for justice 
and remedy for individuals.148 Although the negotiations are fledgling, the prospect of a binding 
treaty on business and human rights, which once seemed fleeting, is closer than ever.  
For the purposes of our discussion above, the treaty could have interesting implications. 
In its current form, the draft elements seek to ‘reaffirm the primacy of human rights law over 
trade and investment agreements’.149 This could strengthen countries’ regulatory basis and 
defence against litigation when, inter alia, adopting regulations to prevent obesity. Further, the 
draft elements recognise the universality of rights, which includes the rights to adequate food and 
health. The draft also draws attention to states’ obligations to ensure that public procurement 
respects human rights,150 a legal avenue that could be used to argue for adequate food in public 
institutions. Further, states have a reinforced role in monitoring and ensuring the adequacy of 
companies’ human rights policies, thus potentially giving more leverage to guide companies in 
compliance with the rights most linked to their function. Vitally, businesses’ obligations are not 
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only negative; they must also prevent human rights impacts.151 Although loosely phrased, 
companies’ obligation to ‘use their influence’ to promote and ensure respect for rights could be 
used to argue against lobbying contrary to the rights to health and food. The draft moots new 
mechanisms for pursuing compliance, including the establishment of an international court or 
committee.152 
While a new treaty could strengthen protection, it also raises several questions. Can the 
international community agree on a sufficiently robust instrument? A treaty will achieve little if 
it fails to enshrine strong standards.153 Already, the international business community is united 
against binding human rights obligations.154 Further, even if a treaty were adopted, would 
enough states ratify? The failure of most states to ratify the Migrant Rights Convention 
demonstrates that agreeing on treaty text is insufficient and not automatically followed by 
widespread ratification, particularly by the states that fear they will incur the greatest burden.155 
It is unlikely that the treaty could bind businesses without state ratification and, in some cases, 
implementation into national law. When a dualist state ratifies a treaty, it also needs to 
incorporate the treaty into national law to ensure that its provisions take effect. Indeed, it must be 
asked whether treaties are more effective than soft law commitments, such as the WHO 
recommendations. Both require political will and resources.  
Secondly, in the meantime and beyond, states could adopt a more active role in 
underscoring food companies’ responsibilities to respect children’s rights to adequate food and 
health, while simultaneously taking their obligation to protect more seriously. States should urge 
companies to identify human rights that are truly salient to their business and ensure that any 
corporate sponsorship upholds children’s best interests. In highlighting companies’ 
responsibilities to the rights to adequate food and health, states should call on companies to 
comply with WHO recommendations that concretise responsibilities in the context of obesity. At 
the same time, states and businesses’ responsibilities must not be conflated. States should adopt 
national action plans on implementing the UNGP and identify areas where legislation is 
necessary to ensure compliance, such as where conflict of interests between companies and the 
public render self-regulation inappropriate. Further, states should pursue transparency in their 
interactions with the food industry and avoid conflicts. Yet, countries that do not fully recognise 
socioeconomic rights - such as the US, which has neither ratified the ICESCR nor CRC - are 
unlikely to take an active role in requiring companies to respect these rights, and instead focus on 
compliance with civil and political rights. 
Thirdly, as companies’ responsibilities in relation to obesity are ill-defined, civil society 
and academics could develop business and human rights indicators to guide companies and press 
                                                 
151 Ibid Obligations of TCs 3.2. 
152 Ibid Preventive Measures 4. 
153 Geoffrey Cannon, 'Why the Bush administration and the global sugar industry are determined to demolish the 
2004 WHO global strategy on diet, physical activity and health' (2004) 7 Public Health Nutrition 369. 
154 International Chamber of Commerce, UN treaty on business and human rights: business response to elements for 
a draft legally binding instrument (20 October 2017) https://iccwbo.org/publication/un-treaty-business-human-
rights-business-response-elements-draft-legally-binding-instrument/ accessed 16 November 2017. 
155 Currently only 48 states have ratified the CMW, see, ‘Ratification Status for CMW - International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’, available here: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CMW&Lang=en. 
23 
 
for implementation.156 So, what would business and human rights’ indicators look like in relation 
to childhood obesity? Some emerging practices on the right to water may provide guidance.157 
For instance, both Nestlé and PepsiCo consider their impact on communities’ rights to physical 
acceptability and affordability of water.158 In academic discourse, it has been asserted that 
companies must not over-consume or deplete community water. They should ensure that 
individuals have access to ‘safe, sufficient, acceptable, accessible and affordable water’.159 
Achieving this requires greater consideration of companies’ broader impact on communities. For 
example, following complaints, the dairy company Arla conducted human rights impact 
assessments in Nigeria and Senegal to establish the extent to which supplying powdered milk in 
those markets would affect local farmers. The report centred on the company’s impact on 
farmers’ rights to an adequate standard of living, not the public’s right to adequate food.160 
Arguably, the same due diligence could be applied to food companies’ impact on sustainable 
diets.  
5 Conclusion 
As inalienable, universal norms, human rights could be a force to demand accountability 
for global food and beverage companies’ negative impacts on children’s rights to health and 
adequate food. Yet, human rights practice in the field of obesity prevention is underdeveloped. 
Because of the inherent flexibility of the UNGP, food and beverage companies currently promote 
consumer ‘choice’ as CSR, while ignoring children’s rights to adequate food and health. This 
article progresses the discourse on food companies and human rights, but further research is 
needed. 
The article argued that food and beverage companies should analyse their adverse impact 
on the rights to adequate food and health, in the context of childhood obesity. Drawing on the 
Shift framework and Bilchitz’s research, it is reasonable to demand that food companies to 
consider these rights at the core of their functions, and in light of the scale and scope of the 
impact. The analysis has yielded a first proposal for how food and beverage companies can 
analyse their impact on the rights closest to their business.161 To respect these rights, companies 
should cease undermining public health, such as through lobbying regulators to weaken 
evidence-based laws and attacking science. Further, human rights recommendations emphasise 
that food companies should avoid displacing sustainable healthy diets, and reformulate unhealthy 
products. Emerging practice on the right to water suggests that food companies should, in 
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consultation with stakeholders, assess communities’ rights and nutritional need before entering 
new markets. The entry of processed food into developing countries can collapse local food 
sellers.162 Nutritional needs must be defined in line with evidence-based guidelines, not 
companies’ own, compromised nutrition models. 
Companies should further be guided by recommendations from organisations with 
complementary aims to human rights bodies, such as WHO. Drawing on WHO 
recommendations, to respect children’s rights, companies should ensure that pledges aim to 
reduce the impact of unhealthy marketing, and reduce exposure and power of such marketing. 
Companies should avoid marketing unhealthy food, instead promoting nutritionally adequate 
foods. Commitments should be independently monitored, and child-friendly complaints 
mechanisms with remedies made available. Finally, companies should honour their commitments 
without promoting their brands. Instead of events like the Olympics being dominated by fries and 
sodas, healthy imagery without branding could have a far more positive impact on health.  
However, states remain the main duty bearers and should, including through WHO, shape 
an environment that compels companies to respect rights. As food and beverage companies have 
a conflict of interest, government regulators, in consultation from public health experts, should 
set legal parameters, such as, which food is healthy or unhealthy, and what information must be 
disclosed on labelling. Given their obligations under the CRC and ICESCR, states must play a 
vital role in scoping companies’ responsibilities and defining key terms like ‘healthy’ and 
‘children’, which food and beverage companies are unsuitable to do. Where pledges do not meet 
their aims, regulators must act, not merely threaten. 
                                                 
162 Stuckler and others (n 26) 2. 
